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The reform of higher education in Russia, based on standardized tests and educational 
vouchers, was intended to reduce inequalities in access to higher education. The initiative with 
the vouchers has failed and by now is already forgotten while the national test is planned to be 
introduced nationwide in 2009. The national test called to replace the present corrupt system of 
entry examinations has experienced numerous problems so far and will likely have even more 
problems in the future. This paper analyses the reform and suggests a methodology of measuring 
effects of the reform on access to higher education. 
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Introduction 
Russian education is strong and has a proud tradition. All school-age children have access 
to school places and 98.9 percent of adults are literate. In 1992 a large part of the education 
sector was decentralized to the regional level. Most regions benefit from the federal transfers. 
These transfers, however, has fallen both in relative terms and relative to what the regions 
themselves spend. Fluctuating between 3.4 and 4.5 percent of GDP, public expenditure on 
education has fallen during the 1990s. It fells at a rate of 6 percent per year (World Bank, 2001). 
The decentralization process coincided with growing regional economic inequality and 
inequality in access to education. Inequality in access to higher education is considered as one of 
the major components of social inequalities in the society. The decrease in this type of inequality 
is expected to be of primary importance for successful economic transformation and future 
sustainable development. 
The Commission for Economic Reform requested the Ministry of Education of the 
Russian Federation to prepare proposals to increase efficiency and to reduce unit costs in 
education while improving relevance to the needs of transforming economy. Reform of 
education financing, including new systems to make fiscal flows to schools and higher education 
more transparent and the use of the funds more efficient, was an objective. The Development 
Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2010 emphasizes the recovery of social capital as a 
major goal of the reform. 
There are two projects implemented by the Government of the Russian Federation: “The 
General State Examination,” and “The Reform of Financing of Higher Education through the 
Implementation of the State Personified Financial Obligations.” This paper presents the general 
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concept, expected results, and suggestions for evaluation and measurements of possible effects of 
the projects on the existing inequalities in access to higher education. 
 
Current situation in higher education in Russia 
Higher education in Russia is under pressure because of the reduction in federal funding 
and the need to modernize curricular content and teaching methods in higher education 
institutions. Important indications of efforts to adjust to the changing needs of people for 
education and the needs of businesses for human resources are changes in distribution of 
admissions and graduations by areas of specialization, an increase in the number of new private 
colleges that provide training in the most wanted areas, and changes in the standards and content 
of educational programs. The system responded to the reduced federal funding by increasing 
extra-budgetary and local budget sources. The higher education sector continues to suffer from a 
lack of clearly defined responsibilities between the governing agencies together with an 
incomplete legal framework and a lack of transparency in the allocation and use of public 
funding. The developing commercialization and widespread corruption on all levels of the 
governing structure and higher education institutions are also a matter of public concern. 
Federal funding for higher education continues to decrease. In addition to the programs 
where students study for free and receive stipends, all public universities have programs financed 
by the tuition students pay. All private universities are for-profit. There are no traditions or 
practices of donations and charitable giving to higher education institutions. There are no 
scholarships for students as well. The system of governmental or public and commercial or 
private educational loans is not in place. Absence of public and private educational loans causes 
additional difficulties in access to higher education, especially for the poor. The government is 
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now discussing possible development of a system of educational loans. 54 percent of students 
pay for their education, while 46 percent are paid by the federal government and the local 
administrations. By law the government funds the education of students according to the rate of 
170 students per 10000 of population. In fact, it pays for 190 per 10000, i.e. even more than is 
required by the law. Free compulsory secondary education of a high quality creates opportunities 
for individuals. During the period from 1989 to 2000, the share of people with higher education 
degrees participating in the labor force increased almost twice and reached 25 percent (Sandgren, 
2002; Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, 2007). The dynamics of the 
number of students in higher education institutions per 10000 population in the Russian 
Federation in 1980-1999 are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
Number of students in higher education institutions per 10000 population in the Russian 
Federation, 1980-1999 
 
Year  
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Russia 
 219 219 218 216 213 206 200 194 190 193 
Year  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Russia 
 190 186 177 171 171 188 201 221 245 280 
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics, retrieved from 
the database in August 8, 2006. 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of the number of students in higher education institutions per 10000 
population in the Russian Federation in 1980-1999 
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics, retrieved from 
the database in August 8, 2006. 
 
At the same time in Russia, a country consisting of eighty-nine regions, a population of 
one hundred and fifty millions and eleven time zones, there is no one universal national 
standardized examination for high school graduates. In order to enter any public or private higher 
education institution, the high school graduates must be present at the college of their choice to 
pass competitive entry examinations. Competition to enter government-financed programs is 
high. Statistics on the growing competition are presented graphically in Figure 2. 
 
 7
160
165
170
175
180
185
190
195
200
205
210
1993 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Figure 2. Contest for admittance to public and municipal higher education institutions in 
the Russian Federation, 1993-2005 (number of applicants per 100 places). 
Source: Composed from: Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. In G. 
Satarov (Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM Foundation. Retrieved 
May 12, 2006 from http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm  
 
All public higher education institutions run entry examination sessions at the same time, 
once a year. There is no legal way to apply to more than one institution at a time. Those not 
accepted have an opportunity to enter a for-tuition program at a public university or a private 
college that requires full tuition. Private colleges do enroll students after the period of entry 
examinations if they have vacancies. Rampant corruption transforms public universities into 
“family enterprises,” where government-financed places are distributed among the relatives and 
friends of the faculty and administration. This creates enormous inequalities in access to higher 
education. Presence of corruption in Russian universities is broadly acknowledged (Bondarev, 
2002; Glebov, 2007; RBC, 2007; RIA Novosti, 2004; Rudenko, 2002). 
Some households are unable to cover travel expenses for their children to a university of 
their choice to take entry examinations. Some candidates with high academic potential do not 
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accept the risk of competing for places in top schools. If not accepted, they will not be able to 
compete even in lower tier colleges, since the time for entry examinations will be over. The 
number of places financed from the central budget continues to decrease. State expenditures on 
education decreased from 3.6 percent of GDP in 1991-1992 to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2000. State 
expenditures on education in 2000 were 48 percent of 1991 levels. State financing of higher 
education decreased from 1.2 to 0.4 percent of GDP. The average wage in education decreased 
from 62 percent of the average for the economy in 1992 to 54 percent in 2000.The average age 
of faculty members is 55 years in the social sciences and humanities and 60 years in the technical 
sciences (World Bank, 2001). 
In the USSR information, application, examinations, and housing for prospective students 
were free. However, each year everyone had an opportunity to take entry examinations only in 
one of the Moscow universities, and then, if unsuccessful, they could try to enter any other 
university. All the universities were fully funded by the state while the private sector was absent. 
The national economy is in transition as values, incentives, and the allocation of resources 
change. At the beginning of the transition, all the public universities realized that the demand on 
higher education is much higher than the supply of educational services, especially in the social 
sciences. The public represented a demand for knowledge, diplomas, and prestige associated 
with higher education. They started to organize for tuition programs within the departments in 
the universities and in the branches and affiliations outside, located in different towns. Later 
many of these departments became private universities. Each public university has departments, 
where at least some of the students pay for the study. Many students seek diplomas, not 
knowledge. The state guarantees all the diplomas from the universities that have passed 
accreditation. Many of the students need a diploma to satisfy a requirement for holding the job 
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they already have. With a high level of unemployment and low real wages, opportunity costs for 
prospective and current students in higher education are very low. It keeps tuitions low and the 
demand on degrees high. 
Top schools continue to generate excessive demand and select students with 
characteristics they want by using the system of entry examinations. This is one of the major 
arguments for the system of entrance, where the applicant has to appear in person in college and 
pass the examinations. Maintaining selectivity requires the generation of demand and restriction 
of supply. Before 1990, supply was restricted by the central government. After 1990, colleges 
created for-tuition programs where virtually everyone was able to enroll. The previously existing 
system, where high student quality was a result of selectivity, and selectivity, in its turn, was a 
result of high student quality, was seriously undermined by all different types of corruption. 
Private education started not because of the budget cuts, but because of the higher degree 
of financial freedom and high demand on certain specialties in higher education. Only later 
budgets of the public universities were cut. There are no private, not-for-profit universities in 
Russia. Public universities are more prestigious than the private ones; they possess buildings, 
libraries, notable social facilities, and thus are attractive for privatization. To avoid the negative 
experience of privatization in the industry, government should not be hasty in making decisions. 
A pure market in higher education at this time is impossible, because there is no pure market in 
the country. 
The state is represented in the industry by public universities. However, the status of a 
public or state university cannot be interpreted as if it is completely owned, governed, managed, 
and financed by the government. These functions of financing, management, governance, and 
ownership can be distributed differently or shared. Some of the oldest and strongest universities 
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had an experience in self-governance before 1917. With the gradual decentralization of higher 
education, self-governance should become stronger along with self-financing. It will create 
pluralism in forms of ownership, management, and organizational structure. The process will be 
synchronized with the continuing market reforms and will become one of their locomotives. 
In 2000 54 percent of all students who entered higher education institutions paid full 
tuition. Overall, 40 percent of students study for tuition. Students in private colleges constitute 
10 percent of all students. Only 20 percent of students for tuition are students in private colleges. 
Public universities play a leading role in for-tuition programs. The value of all paid higher 
education services in 2000 was equal to 0.6 percent of GDP. Around 20 percent of all students 
enter colleges for bribes. Some people prefer to pay a bribe because it may be cheaper than full 
tuition for the period of study. Another reason is that the bribe is paid once for the entrance to the 
budget-financed program, while tuition in a for-tuition program may increase from year to year 
during the four- to six-year period of study. There were more than 1000 cases of bribery for 
entering higher education recorded in 2001. By estimation, the amount of money spent on 
illegally accessing higher education is equal to 0.75 percent of the GDP (Konstantinovskiy, 
2001). In households with children under 16 saving for higher education is the highest priority, 
leaving behind health care, durable goods, housing, cars, and insurance. 
Education by correspondence is the fastest growing form of education and now 
constitutes the sector that enrolls 40 percent of all students, while in 1992 it was only 25 percent. 
During the 10-year period from 1991 to 2001, the share of graduates from the sciences decreased 
from 9 to 7 percent, while the share of graduates majoring in economics and business 
administration increased from 14 to 22 percent (Konstantinovskiy, 2001). The structure of 
specialization does not correspond perfectly with the labor market demand that can be explained 
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by the rapid changes in the economy. Observations indicate that the drop out from secondary 
education has a social character. As a result, as the number of children from poor households 
who drop out from high school increases, the percentage of children from wealthier households 
who go on to college increases. Differences in access to higher education are based on 
differences in the following areas: academic abilities; quality of obtained secondary education; 
amount and quality of additional educational services obtained, such as extracurricular courses in 
high school, preparation courses, private tutoring, etc.; access to the information about higher 
education institutions; physical disabilities; educational level of family members; family income; 
social capital of family; place of residence; and citizenship. 
Observations indicate that socio-economic factors are most significant when it comes to 
access to higher education, especially to top schools. Three major factors are household income, 
place of residence, and quality of secondary education. People in poor households, rural areas, 
and economically depressed regions have less access to higher education. If in 1990 75 percent 
of students in Moscow were from the regions, now they constitute only 25 percent (Kuzminov et. 
al., 2002). 
 
Description of the projects 
There are two educational policy projects implemented by the federal government: The 
General State Examination (GSE), begun in 2001, and The Reform of Financing of Higher 
Education through the Implementation of the State Personified Financial Obligations (SPFO), 
also known as educational vouchers, begun in the academic year 2002/2003 and running through 
the 2003/2004 academic year. The first is a project with a standardized, computer-graded 
examination, which will be used for entrance to universities; the second is a project that 
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introduces a voucher-based system of higher education funding. The General State Examination 
is analogous to the US national educational tests (such as the SAT and ACT), and the French 
Baccalaureate, and is referred to as the national test. 
The projects were conducted in the sixteen regions that represent all different types of 
regions in the country. All high school graduates in the sixteen regions take the national test in 
one of the 1938 places, where the national test is conducted, in number of subjects, to be defined 
in each region. Set of the subjects included in the national test varies from region to region. 
Mathematics is included in the national test in all the sixteen regions, Russian in twelve, Physics 
in ten, Chemistry in ten, Biology in nine, Geography in six, History in six, and Social Science in 
four regions. Samarskaya oblast1 includes all the nine subjects in the national test; Saha 
(Yakutiya), Novosibirskaya oblast, and Chuvashiya eight; Novgorodskaya oblast seven; 
Rostovskaya, Pskovskaya, Orenburgskaya, and Kaliningradskaya oblast five; Mariy El four; 
Krasnoyarskiy Kray, Tomskaya oblast, Cheliabinskaya oblast, and Mordoviya two; 
Bashkortostan and Udmurtiya one. 
Results of the examinations are graded on a scale from one to five, that is A+, A, B, C, 
and D (letters adapted to Latin alphabet by the author). Every high school graduate, except those 
who receive a D, obtains an educational voucher with a value corresponding to the grade 
received. The vouchers are grants that can be spent only on higher education and should not be 
refinanced. One of the major characteristics of educational vouchers is portability. A portable 
voucher can be taken by a prospective student to any higher education institution that participates 
in the project. Anyone from non-participating regions or graduates from previous years can take 
the national test. It is set up so that the top 5 percent get an A+, the next 15 percent an A, next 40 
                                                 
1 Oblast – an administrative territorial unit, analogous to a region. 
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percent get B, the next 25 percent a C, and the lowest 20 percent a D. No vouchers are assigned 
to those with a D score (Kuzminov, et. al., 2002). 
There are 140 institutions participating in the projects. The only institutions that 
participate are public higher education institutions under the authority of the Ministry of 
Education within the participating regions. Public higher education institutions under the 
authority of other Ministries may apply to be considered for participation in the projects. Some 
quotas and restrictions are imposed. All higher education institutions that participate are allowed 
to enroll in all programs only applicants with educational vouchers. The number of students 
whose educational vouchers will cover full tuition and fees without any other extra payment 
should be not less than 50 per cent of all enrolled, including not less than 25 per cent in each 
program. Each participating institution indicates the admission test score and tuition three 
months prior to the application deadline. Application is free of charge. Access to the information 
is free and available to the public. 
All participating students are free to disregard their national test score and educational 
vouchers and take competitive entry examinations in higher education institutions of the non-
participating regions. They are also free to retake the examination each year. The government 
covers the cost of the student’s educational voucher to a college/university during four to six 
years of study, depending on the length of the program. It is expected that colleges will compete 
for better students, since they will bring vouchers with higher monetary values. It will result in 
an increase in quality of higher education. 
The goals of the projects are presented by the governmental agencies as follows: 
• establish the mechanism of financing higher education institutions on the basis of 
SPFO; 
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• increase access to professional education; 
• adequately estimate preparation of high school graduates and equal opportunities 
to enter colleges; 
• establish a closer link between secondary and professional education; 
• maintain equivalency of the state documents (certificates) of secondary education; 
• establish state control of quality of secondary education based on independent 
evaluation. 
This paper suggests identifying the goals of the projects as follows: 
• decrease inequality in access to higher education; 
• improve financing of higher education; 
• increase effectiveness and efficiency of higher education; 
• establish a closer link between secondary and higher education; 
• reduce corruption in access to higher education. 
The reform is based on the hypothesis that a decrease in inequality in access to higher 
education and redistribution of the state funds among public and private higher education 
institutions will lead to an increase in quality of students and higher education services and to 
more efficient and effective functioning of the system. It will facilitate accumulation of human 
and social capital and strengthen of social cohesion in the nation. Hot public debates about the 
usefulness of the reform continue (Filippov, 2001; Adamskiy, 2002; Sergeev, 2002; Slavina, 
2002; Smolentseva, 2000, 2002; Oberemko, 2006; MacWilliams, 2007). 
The projects, as well as the idea of the reform, are heavily criticized. Those opposed to 
the policy experiments consider higher education a public good. Since it is not available to all, 
the opportunity to get a higher education for free is considered a public good. They support 
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selection on the basis of competitive entry examinations and full financing of all students. Some 
of the critics accept the existence of private higher education, but insist that it should be separate 
from public education (Kolesov, 2002; Sadovnichiy, 2001). They believe that the reform will 
lead to an increase in inequality and corruption, an eradication of free higher education, a 
decrease in its quality, a weakening of free secondary education, and its commercialization. 
Sergei Lisovsky, a senator in the Federation Council, or upper house of Parliament, called the 
exam “the total destruction of the quality of education in Russia” (MacWilliams, 2007, p. A20). 
Under the law, some of the leading universities, including Moscow State University, would 
retain the right to continue administering their own entry examinations. 
Critics of the reform predict an increase in the educational bureaucracy and transaction 
costs needed to regulate voucher financing schemes and the national test (Kolesov, 2002). 
Educational vouchers create the wrong incentives for many high school graduates. First, many 
think that it is better to live with a diploma than without one. Second, entering college means 
deferring military service. Admission to a college is considered a way to avoid draft. People who 
receive a voucher of certain, even if low value, would be willing to use it to enter a low-quality 
college, and would use it even if they had not planned to attend college. 
The national test is going to be introduced nationwide in 2009 (Lemutkina, 2006). Many 
doubt its objectivity and point the fact that the test was initially approved for nationwide use in 
2006, followed by two postponements, in 2007 and 2008. Even before its introduction 
nationwide, it is clear that the test is not free of corruption. In a few regions the results of the test 
have been annulated because of suspicion of massive falsifications and violations of the protocol. 
McWilliams (2007, A20) comments: “Ironically, the test has been soiled by the very corruption 
it was designed to root out. Test scores have been annulled in regions that reported suspiciously 
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high results. Only last week the Prosecutor General's Office accused officials at the Federal 
Testing Center -- which processes the standardized tests for the Federal Service for the 
Supervision of Education and Science -- of spending some 33 million rubles in state funds on 
spurious business trips, private purchases, and fictitious contracts.” 
Supporters of the new examination system argue that the reform will create equal 
opportunities in access to higher education, prevent corruption, and make higher education a 
demand-driven industry. Intervention is based on the assumption that since low-income 
households, cannot afford to pay for their children to travel far from home to take entry 
examinations, let alone pay for tuition, and since entry examinations are corrupted, 
implementation of the national examinations will increase access to higher education for children 
from lower-income households. 
Supporters of the voucher plan assume that the state personified financial obligations or 
vouchers will give real value to the academic credits and achievements of prospective students in 
secondary and high school in the market of higher education and will increase the quality of 
students because of the anticipated decrease in inequality in access to higher education. It will 
increase the role of personal academic achievement in obtaining higher education and decrease 
the role of household income. Among other expected positive effects are a decrease in 
corruption, better budget distribution and allocation of the state budget, and an increase in quality 
and adequacy of higher education. 
Competitiveness in national higher education will also be influenced by demographics. 
Kuzmin points out that between 2000 and 2008, the number of pupils in secondary education 
will decline by seven million. The number of students in secondary education institutions will 
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decrease from 21 million in 1999 to 14 million in 2008. In 2000, 1.5 million have graduated from 
high schools and 1.3 million entered higher education (Kuzmin, et al., 2002). 
 
Evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects 
Evaluation should be focused on the goal of decreasing inequality in access to higher 
education. Evaluation is based on the assumption that the intervention will lead to statistically 
significant effects, i.e. the percentage of students from low-income households in colleges in the 
participating regions will increase. The assumption here is that inequalities in academic 
achievement will be smaller and independent of income. Otherwise, inequality in access to 
higher education after intervention may increase. 
Evaluation can be summative, that is “done for, or by, any observers or decision-makers 
(by contrast with developers) who need to evaluate conclusions for any other reasons besides 
development.” (Scriven, 1991, p. 35) Evaluation could be designed to find out whether 
implementing the projects led to a decrease in inequality in access to higher education, which 
will be indicated in the percentage of students from each decile who entered higher education 
institutions, and by the percentage of higher education institutions entered in each decile. 
Projects are quasi-experimental. Weiss points out: “Quasi-experiments have the advantage of 
being practical when conditions prevent true experimentation.” (Weiss, 1972, p. 67) 
Opportunity in access to higher education will be measured by the result, i.e. of entering 
higher education. It assumes that changes in the result are an indicator of changes in the 
opportunity. All the measurements will be taken before and after the project’s implementation in 
the participating and non-participating regions. Key measures should include income inequality 
indices, educational inequality indices, and inequalities in the educational voucher values. 
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Since the sixteen participating regions in the pilot projects constitute quite a 
representative group of the country’s regions with all their diverse characteristics, but not a 
random sample, a comparison group of sixteen regions will be selected by way of matching 
based on such characteristics as income inequality, number and quality of higher education 
institutions, and geographic location, in order to compare the inequality measures. As stated by 
Rossi and Freeman: “The most common of quasi-experimental designs involves constructing 
control or comparison groups in an attempt to approximate a randomized design.” (Rossi and 
Freeman, 1999, p. 310) 
There are no federal, regional, or commercial educational loans in place that make the 
task of evaluation easier, since there are no fluctuations in the credit market and other connected 
issues to be dealt with. However, there are a number of validity threats when it comes to 
attributing changes to the projects and interpreting effects as the result of intervention alone. 
An observed effect might be due to an event that takes place between the pre-test and the 
post-test that is not the treatment, and may be present in the following forms: 
People’s priorities in regard to higher education may change from year to year. 
The projects take place in 2002 and 2003 with the national test running every year till the 
present, and the populations awareness of the results of the previous year may cause changes in 
the behavior of different strata with regard to higher education, making them either more or less 
active in entering higher education institutions. 
There are a number of other changes that may occur before and during the period of 
project implementation, which can influence access to higher education, including changes in the 
federal and regional legislation, budget financing and budget deficit, changes in the total voucher 
fund, total number of places in higher education and budget-financed places in particular, income 
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inequality, tuitions in both public and private higher education institutions, rules and 
requirements for licensing and accreditation, restrictions imposed on corruption, demographic 
changes, changes in the labor market and economic situation overall. All of these changes, if 
identified and measured properly, may be included in the econometric model and their effects 
captured. Some of the changes occur nationwide while others take place on the regional level. 
The changes with significant variation will be included as independent variables, and major 
changes in time, if specified, may be represented by the dummy variables in order to capture 
fixed effects. 
People are not required to take advantage of their vouchers. Of course, one can count 
how many people did not use their vouchers and the total sum of unused vouchers, but people 
may use them in the future, or they may think they will retake the national test in the hope of 
receiving a better score and a voucher of a higher value. It is impossible to predict how many 
people will take advantage of their vouchers and how many will retake examinations in an 
attempt to improve their score. Also, the value of vouchers changes year by year. Lower national 
test scores today may have a higher voucher value than a higher national test score a year later. 
All people act differently. The evaluation is based on the assumption that since the opportunity 
costs of attending higher education institutions are very low and unlikely to change dramatically 
during the period of 2002-2004, almost all voucher-holders would use them. Presumably, even 
lower-value vouchers will satisfy tuition requirements for the low-quality higher education. 
Another threat is that the government may manipulate the data; the results of the national 
test and the size of tuition in colleges may be manipulated as well, in order to give the false 
impression that the projects were successful. In order to safeguard against possible manipulations 
on the measurements, the data from all different sources, including those of the National 
 20
Training Foundation and the World Bank, may be used. These measures, however, will mostly 
prevent manipulations with data, not with the content. 
The maturation threat was unlikely at the early stages of the project implementation since 
the public is not familiar with the national test. The situation may change by the year 2007 and 
later, when general content and the composition of the tests will become familiar to the high 
school students and prospective students will take preparatory courses. Also, everyone is free to 
take the national test every year. This practice may lead to an increase in the level of test-
required knowledge. However, there are fixed percentages set for the grades for all years, 
independently of the level of academic preparation. 
Despite the fact that all measurements and procedures are the same, there may be some 
problems caused by the following: 
Many households do not know their exact annual income, others will report it 
inaccurately, and many households may choose either to mis-specify their income or not report it 
at all. The precise determination of household income is crucially important for the purpose of 
identifying income thresholds and assignment of the representatives to the income deciles. In 
order to make the data as correct and reliable as possible, information from the State Tax Office 
should be used for the calculations of the Gini coefficient and the distribution index (DI) for 
income, and students from different deciles in higher education institutions should be identified. 
There is a different set of subjects in the national test in each of the participating regions. 
These sets were selected by the regions independently. The evaluators may consider such 
differences a failure of the designers of the quasi-experiments and may not see any viable 
solutions to that. The sets of subjects can be grouped into seven groups, and the scores can be 
separated by subject, but even then it will still cause enormous differences in requirements for 
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the enrollment and the unequal degree of educational mobility among prospective students from 
the different participating regions. 
Changes in household income and the level of inflation will not have an influence on the 
interpretation of the results. The DI and other indexes measure inequalities in relative terms. The 
move from one income decile to the other or a change in the absolute values of the deciles’ 
income thresholds is not a problem, keeping everything in relative terms. 
It is important to note that the proposed evaluation measures access to higher education 
as a fact of entry to a higher education institution. Depending on the definition of the term 
“access” it may seem more precise to observe not only the fact of entry alone, but also process of 
education and different obstacles to pursue the degree, including dropout rates for the groups 
with different socio-economic characteristics. The retention and attrition may be non-random. 
However, two-year period of the projects does not give an opportunity to obtain and process such 
data. The national test may be evaluated based on its continuity. 
The selection threat exists to the extent to which the government is able to manipulate the 
selection of participating regions. The selected regions could be those with a relatively high 
average household income, a large number of the higher education institutions and budget-
financed places in them, and a strong secondary education system. However, when the selected 
regions have been characterized not as advantaged or disadvantaged, but rather as typical, then 
the selection threat, if any, is insignificant. A comparison group, selected on the basis of region-
by-region matching by the evaluators, will control for the potential selection threat. As 
recognized by Weiss: “Unlike experimental design, which protects against just about all possible 
threats to internal validity, quasi-experimental designs generally leave one or several of them 
uncontrolled.” (Weiss, 1972, p.67) 
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Since there are no educational loans, changes in inequality in access to higher education 
could be interpreted as a result of the intervention of the projects. Income inequality is high and 
stable. The results obtained from this project can be generalized and said to apply to all eighty-
nine regions of the Russian Federation and to Ukraine and Belarus as well. The results, however, 
may not be applied to the two leading educational centers of the Russian Federation - Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, - since they do not participate in the projects. There is the highest 
concentration of nationally recognized top higher education institutions in these two cities, and a 
high average level of household income and income distribution is not typical for the rest of the 
country. Hence, a comparison group that will match them may not be assigned. 
There are a number of challenges to the appropriateness of the results owing to the quasi-
experimental design of the projects. Only public higher education institutions participate in the 
project. Private higher education institutions have not participated, but will participate in the 
future. Thus the results do not provide us with a general picture. In fact, only one of two sectors 
of the market is targeted, that is state higher education institutions. The public sector is under the 
direct control of the federal and regional governments and may easily be manipulated. Data will 
also be collected by the government agencies. 
The federal government is planning a significant increase in the funding of higher 
education that may lead to a subsequent increase in the total number of the government-financed 
places in public higher education institutions. It will create more opportunities for the applicants 
from low-income households to enroll in higher education institutions. It may, however, be done 
for the period of the projects only. After the recording of positive results, i.e. the decrease in 
inequality in access to higher education, the federal funding may be cut down. This scenario is 
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especially possible since the general trend for the last fifteen years indicates a decrease in 
government funding of higher education institutions. 
The total value of voucher funds is planned to be determined each year based on the 
overall capacity of the federal budget and regional budgets. This creates two challenges for the 
evaluation of the projects: 
a) For the period of the projects’ duration the voucher fund will be increased 
significantly. Hence, the value of each type of vouchers for the grades A+, A, B, 
and C, will be high. It will be high enough for prospective students with a B or 
may be a C to enter higher education institutions without making extra payments 
or else by making extra payments that are smaller than they would be otherwise. 
b) After the projects considered as successful and the government’s mission as 
accomplished, if implemented nationwide, total value of the voucher fund may be 
decreased voluntarily and the distribution of this fund among all the high school 
national test takers will decrease the value of the individual vouchers 
dramatically. 
Due to the expectation of tough control from the government, corruption in entry 
examinations may decrease significantly. It will result in an increase in the number of accepted 
applicants from low-income households to the government-funded places. After the projects 
have been converted into the national system, governmental control will decrease and corruption 
will regain its hold. 
Obtaining the voucher creates psychological “to use” and economic “extra value” 
incentives to enter higher education institutions for those who did not plan to do so and would 
not do otherwise. People would prefer to use their voucher instead of loosing it. Many people 
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will also consider vouchers as a valuable addition to cover part of the cost of their education. The 
massive information campaign, including all types of the media and the internet, also creates a 
certain rush and increases incentives to take a chance at studying in a higher education 
institution. 
Top schools, as well as a number of other participating higher education institutions, are 
forced to have quotas on admissions for the applicants with the national test scores. Any quotas 
are externally imposed and provide somewhat biased information. With the quotas in place, more 
applicants will be accepted in the top schools than would happen otherwise. The stipend support 
that comes from the old system will also apply to the holders of the national test scores. In the 
future, however, when the system is implemented nationwide, admission quotas for the national 
test score applicants will be abolished and top schools will enroll on the basis of the national test 
score plus the voucher value and an extra payment. No stipend will be provided to such students 
by the government. Applicants from low-income households will be cut off from the top schools 
almost entirely. The size of an extra payment will be determined based on the increasing 
competition and justified by the fact that the voucher value will not cover total cost of providing 
education at the top higher education institutions. 
High school graduates of previous years from any region can take the national test in the 
participating regions for the minimal fee. The increase in applications based on the national test 
will increase pressure on the limited number of the government-financed places in public higher 
education institutions, which will result in an increased share of representatives from low-income 
households in public higher education institutions and move some applicants from the middle-
income households into the country’s private higher education institutions, since these 
institutions are not allowed to participate in the projects. 
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One of the most misleading assumptions being made by the supporters of the projects is 
that growing competition between colleges and universities will result not only in an increase in 
the quality of the educational programs they offer, but in the reduction of the cost of education as 
well. The model was developed mathematically by the supporters of the projects. It manifests an 
expected decrease in inequality in access to higher education. In our view, the real price of 
education is not voucher-value-driven. It depends heavily on the costs of providing educational 
services. A decrease in voucher value will not push the price of higher education services down. 
Instead, an extra payment collected in addition to the voucher value will increase. It may result in 
higher extra payments in the top-ranked schools, and, as such, cut applicants from low-income 
households off from these higher education institutions. 
If not accepted based on their national test scores in the participating higher education 
institutions, the national test-takers may take a chance to enter one of the non-participating 
higher education institutions either in their region of residence or any other region, by taking on-
site entry examinations. It will broaden the variety of options for the national test takers and 
increase the probability of their being enrolled in a higher education institution. It may be 
compensated for by the applicants from the non-participating regions and by taking the national 
test to apply to participating higher education institutions. It is difficult to suggest which one of 
these processes will become more influential. The national test is not homogeneous in its 
content. The requirements for the national test scores from the side of the participating higher 
education institutions may vary accordingly. This creates restrictions on the applicant’s mobility 
between the participating regions and the institutions. 
In the evaluation of the projects, access to higher education is considered in terms of 
enrollment. Once an individual is accepted in a higher education institution, he utilizes his access 
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to higher education. In a broader sense access to higher education can be interpreted as 
acceptance to a higher education institution and provision of the means necessary to proceed 
successfully with the study. It will also include dropout rate. However, we cannot take this into 
account in the evaluation, since the projects are designed to continue for two years only. 
Access, i.e. opportunity, is measured by attendance, i.e. the result. The argument in favor 
of measuring access in terms of attendance is that there is little or no room for speculation, since 
the conclusions will be based on the specific results, i.e. number of people accepted to higher 
education institutions. The argument against using this indicator may be that the government 
created conditions necessary to increase equality of opportunity in access to higher education. It 
is up to individuals to take this opportunity. The suggested evaluation ties the opportunity to the 
result. Multiple time-series design and comparison group design will allow us to determine 
whether changes in the outcome variables can be attributed to the program intervention. Multiple 
time-series design can use the data drawn from a number of indicators for all the regions in both 
the project group and the comparison group for the years 1998–2003. The results will indicate 
whether and to what extent intervention led to a decrease in inequality in access to higher 
education. Cohen and Garret note: “Better scientific information will improve policy by making 
decisions more rational. Applied research does not necessarily reduce disagreement. It calls 
attention to the existence of conflicting positions, sometimes elaborates them, generates new 
issues altogether.” (Cohen and Garret, 1991) 
 
Measurements of inequalities in access to higher education in Russia 
The Gini coefficient, which is normally used for measurements in income inequality and 
other inequalities, does not reflect what could be called internal dynamics. More specifically, it 
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does not indicate whether income redistribution to the poorest decile has been made at the 
expense of the richest decile, or middle class, or upper-middle class, or any combination of 
those. The same problem exists when it comes to measuring other forms of inequality while 
using the Gini coefficient. We suggest using another way of measuring inequalities and 
developing an index that will help us measure inequalities in access to higher education. The 
Distribution index allows capturing more precisely than does the Gini coefficient inequalities in 
the distribution of income or access to higher education. 
The DI coefficient for household income can be calculated as follows: 
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where Xi is the share of ith decile in the National Income. 
Based on the fact that there are ten deciles, the value of the DI will be in the range of 
1000 to 10,000. If income will be distributed equally by 10 percent to each decile, the DI will be 
equal to 1000. If the wealthiest decile will concentrate 100 percent of total income, the DI will be 
equal to 10,000. Any changes in distribution will be captured based on squaring of the shares in 
income. An increase in income of the wealthier decile will lead to an increase in the DI. An 
increase in inequality will be indicated by a DI increase. Hence: 
access to higher education = f(household income, ability to study) 
Inequality in access to higher education can be measured with inequality coefficients. 
Accordingly, access to higher education as a dependent variable can be expressed in terms of 
inequality coefficients. Ability to study or scholastic ability can be presented in terms of 
academic achievements measured by the national examination. Also, dummy variable will be 
necessary to control for the program. Other variables may include: index of corruption, budget 
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deficit, price level in higher education, fixed effect for each year to control for influence of 
changes in economic situation. 
Fixed coefficients for each year can be included in the model. All variables will be taken 
for the years 1994 to 2002, for 16 regions-participants and 16 regions from the comparison 
group. The model will indicate to what extent variation in the DI for education is explained by 
variation in the DI for income. Other models will incorporate data on individual and group 
levels, where dependent variable will be presented by the probability of enrollment in higher 
education institution and percentage of enrolled in higher education institution, respectively. 
Independent variables will include individual household income and the national test score, and 
mean of income and academic achievement for the groups. These models will explain to what 
extent probability of enrollment in higher education institution may be predicted by the 
household income, and percentage enrolled in higher education institutions in the certain decile 
predicted by the mean of academic achievement and income for the group. It will show changes 
before and after the reform. Whole point is to make household income as much irrelevant in 
respect to access to higher education, as possible. This point is based on the goal of decrease in 
inequality in access to higher education and should not be referred to the functioning of higher 
education industry overall. 
One of the major assumptions for the model is that in Russia all children have equal 
access to the level of educational quality in secondary education, which will allow them to pass 
the national test successfully. One of the major challenges to the project, but not to the model, 
may be the question whether student performance in secondary school depends on the household 
income, and if yes, to what extent? If students from wealthier families perform better, it will lead 
to the fact that proportionally larger part of voucher money will go to wealthier that in its turn 
 29
will mean even more inequality. The assumption of the intervention is that academic 
achievements of high school students and their national test scores are more income-independent 
than the access to higher education. It means that income-based inequalities in academic 
achievement of high school graduates are less than income-based inequalities in access to higher 
education. If academic achievements are more household income-dependent, than the access to 
higher education, inequality in access to higher education after the intervention may increase. 
It is expected that an increase in access to higher education will result in an increase of 
number of representatives of poor and middle class households in higher education institutions. 
We cannot say that decreased inequality in opportunity entails increased number of students 
from poor households in higher education. It is up to the poor, whether they want to enter 
colleges more intensively, or not. However, we assume that since the wealthier already have an 
access to higher education, with existence of definite income thresholds according to tuitions in 
top schools and local schools, we tend to measure changes in access to higher education by 
changes in number of poor in higher education institutions, and top schools, in particular. 
Deciles obtained from income distribution will be marked starting from 1st for the poorest 
to 10th for the wealthiest. All admitted in higher education institutions will be identified as 
representatives of one of the deciles. Calculation of the DI for education will be made as the 
following: 
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where Xi is the percent of accepted representatives of ith decile in total places in higher 
education. N = 10 (by the number of deciles). 
A variety of distributional patterns in higher education is presented in Figure 3. 
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Total number of places 
in higher education 
 
    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      10      9      8    Population 
                                                                                    (deciles are marked by income) 
Figure 3. Distribution of places in higher education 
 
Observation has been made that children from richest deciles do not occupy largest 
number of places in colleges, but representatives of middle class deciles do. Therefore, it may be 
suggested that income distribution does not present us with the mirror-like or symmetric 
reflection of distribution of places in higher education. The largest share in the National Income 
does not mean that the decile has the largest share of places in higher education institutions, 
occupied by its representatives. It is necessary to say that the share in higher education is not the 
same as access to higher education. Obviously, there is a threshold in terms of household 
income, above which access to higher education depends on willingness of parents and children 
to pursue study in college, rather than on the household income. Number of college age children 
in household and amount of tuition also play a role in defining such income threshold. 
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It can be speculated that despite children from wealthiest deciles do not occupy largest 
number of places in higher education, they may occupy largest number of places in top schools, 
or more likely in for tuition programs and access-by-bribe places of top schools, since all the top 
schools are public. It would be interesting to calculate whether the placement of the decile by 
income is proportional to total sum of money, spent on tuition and fees by the decile. 
The same steps will be undertaken after the implementation of the projects. Results 
obtained before and after the implementation of the projects will be compared. If decrease in the 
DI for education will be indicated decrease in inequality in access to higher education will be 
reported. Conversely, if increase will be indicated in the DI for education, it will be interpreted 
as an increase in inequality in access to higher education. Same measures in comparison group 
will control for any side effects. If the Gini coefficient for education will increase, but the DI for 
education will decrease, the DI will be considered as a more precise and reliable indicator for 
making conclusions. It will be concluded that despite the decrease in the overall inequality 
measured externally decreased, inequality among the deciles in access to higher education 
increased. The problem is that we cannot compare deciles by income and deciles by education. 
Moreover, we cannot measure opportunity, but we can measure access by the result, that is how 
many representatives of each decile enrolled successfully into colleges. 
Since all deciles are of equal size, it does not matter which way inequality is measured: as 
share of people from each decile in higher education, or as share of people in each decile, who 
were accepted by colleges. By transferring shares of entered higher education in each decile into 
100 percent total, the DI for education for share of 1st year college students in each decile can be 
obtained by summarizing all the percentages, then dividing 100 percent over this sum, and 
multiplying percentage in each decile on the coefficient obtained. The proportion coefficient may 
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be calculated simply by dividing total number of households over the number of entered higher 
education in a given year. 
The DI for education, measured on the basis of percentage of those who entered higher 
education institution in each decile will be: 
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where Si is a percentage of those who entered higher education in  decile, thi
Q is the number of households, 
H is the number of people who entered higher education. 
In the experiment deciles may be taken in each region in both the experimental group and 
the comparison group. Higher education, taken in each region is, however, not as precise, since 
people move nationwide to study in colleges. One of the assumptions to be made in order to 
decrease this risk in measurement is to assume that people normally move outside the region of 
residence if they plan to enter top ranking that is national level schools. Otherwise they choose to 
study in the local college within the region of residence. Assuming this, problem can be solved 
by identifying national and local level higher education institutions. 
Two segmentations will be made. First, all colleges will be classified into three groups 
depend upon the tuition they charge: $3000 a year and up, $1000 to $3000, less than $1000. 
Schools in the first group are the top schools. Schools in the second group are mid-level, and 
schools in the third group are low-level quality. Segmentation can also be done on public and 
private higher education institutions. The weighted DI coefficient for education will be 
introduced in order to capture inequalities in access to higher education expressed in terms of 
differences in percentage of representatives of different deciles in different groups of higher 
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education institutions. This measure will be used to estimate the overall inequality of a set of 
markets, which are colleges of groups I, II and III. 
Let us assume that ikγ  is a share of representatives of decile i in college group k. i = 1, 2, 
3, … N. N = 10 by number of deciles. k = 1, 2, 3. K = 3 by number of the groups. 
Xik is the share of the decile i in college group k within the K college groups. 
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L  is the share of the decile i across the K college groups. ik
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The DI for education for college group k can be calculated as following: 
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Weighted share of decile i can be calculated as follows: 
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The Weighted DI for education for decile i in all three sectors of higher education will be 
calculated as the following: 
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The Weighted DI for education for decile i determines the weighted sector share for the 
 decile across the K sectors of higher education in which it is presented. thi
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It will be necessary to introduce Share weighted DI to estimate the overall degree to 
which a decile might benefit from its specific higher education share combined with the overall 
sector concentration in the specific sectors it is represented. 
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The weighted average of sector specific DIs multiplied by the decile’s sector share in 
each group of colleges (or any other type of sectors, depending on segmentation) is taken across 
each of the K groups in which the  decile is presented. The square root is taken to return the 
estimate to a range similar to the traditional DI calculation. 
thi
The hypothesis can be made that elimination of the government-financed places will cut 
applicants from poor households from the top schools. The reasons for this hypothesis may be 
formulated as the following: 
1) Top schools will have more applicants with the highest (A+) value vouchers 
than they have places. This competition will lead to an increase of tuition over 
the value of the voucher. As a result, only those who will be able to pay extra 
money to cover the difference between the value of voucher and tuition will be 
accepted. Applicants from poor households, unable to make extra payments in 
order to cover the difference, will be separated from the top quality higher 
education. 
2) It is still unclear whether students, whose voucher value will exceed tuition in 
the college, they choose, will get this extra money as their stipend and 
allowance for textbooks and other supplies. Apparently, they will not. Value of 
a voucher is supposed to be transferred to the college directly from the 
government. No other payments are planned, including those from the 
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government to the students that would represent stipend. It creates a situation 
which we would define as “the Latin American case,” when higher education 
institutions are open for everyone, but youth from low-income households 
“choose” to go to the labor market instead of college. One of the major reasons 
for that is that their families are not able to support them during their study. 
Colleges do not pay stipend either. 
If this is true, it will lead to the fact that the top schools in Russia will become completely 
unaffordable for the poor. Also, everyone will prefer to stay as close to home as possible, 
preferably attending college in ones home town, in order to avoid extra costs of living in a 
different city. As a consequence, diversity of the student body in colleges will decrease. All 
concentration will appear within the regions and within the educational centers. The role of place 
of residence may not decrease, but even increase. Also it will lead to weakening the ties between 
the regions, a negative process for the nation building. 
The other important aspect is inequalities in distribution of total value of vouchers 
between the deciles. A share of prospective students entering higher education in each decile is a 
fundamental indicator for measuring inequalities in access to higher education that should be 
measured to evaluate changes in inequalities, caused by the projects, that is impact assessment. 
Despite the fact that value of vouchers will be distributed according to academic 
achievements on the national test, it will be interesting to follow the voucher value distribution 
among the deciles. This inequality can be measured by the DI for vouchers and calculated as 
follows: 
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where Vi is a share of ith decile in the total voucher fund. 
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Despite the fact that the government preserves the right to define total value of voucher 
fund and value of different categories of vouchers, the DI for vouchers still is valid for making 
comparisons in time. There are four types of vouchers by value, according to A+, A, B, and C 
grades on the national test. Shares of the deciles in these four types of vouchers can be measured 
by analogy with the DI for education by the share weighted DI for vouchers. 
It may be found, for instance, that the poorest 1st decile receives larger voucher value in 
the lowest C-grade vouchers, while the middle-class deciles or wealthiest 10th decile receives 
larger voucher value in highest A+ grade vouchers, or may be vise versus. The share weighted 
DI for vouchers will present an exposure of internal changes of shares of the deciles in different 
types of vouchers. 
 
Conclusion 
The reform of higher education in Russia, based on the national examinations and 
educational vouchers, is an attempt of an adequate response to the rapidly changing economic 
environment and the new social order. There are number of validity threats to measurements of 
the projects’ impact and challenges to the reform itself, and possibility of adverse effects, 
including that of an increase in inequality in access to higher education. The Distribution Index 
(DI), the Weighted DI, and the Share Weighted DI can reflect changes in inequalities in access to 
higher education as a result of impact of the reform. 
The national test presents an opportunity to apply in many of universities and makes 
academic achievements in secondary school significant for entering the university. The vouchers 
provide distribution of the central budget among public and private colleges according to their 
attractiveness and give real value to academic achievements on the market of higher education. 
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All households, including most disadvantaged, should have an equal access to higher education 
through the equal access to educational loans. 
By 2007 the test is being used in all but three of Russia’s 88 regions. The initiative with 
the vouchers has failed and by now is already forgotten. Vouchers for higher education remain a 
theory, a perfect plan that has yet to be implemented successfully anywhere in the world. While 
the theory itself is sound, the necessary mechanisms for successful voucherization have yet to be 
developed and tested. Other former Soviet republics watch cautiously the Russian reform. In 
Kyrgyzstan—a small republic in Central Asia—standardized test brought some fruits. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates reduction in corruption in admissions to higher education institutions. 
However, sustainability of the test as well as its positive impact remains an issue (BPC, 2007). In 
Ukraine the standardized test is now being introduced in some of the largest cities, while 
universities run admissions based on the old system of oral and written examinations. 
Corruption will not be reduced with the introduction of the national test. Instead, access 
to corruption will broaden with shift from higher education to secondary education. Higher 
education institutions will prefer to continue taking part in the selection process. A certain 
compromise will be found in the near future. Undoubtedly, college faculty will retain at least 
partial discretion over the admissions and hence access to higher education. 
The national test has experienced numerous problems so far and will likely have even 
more problems in the future. However, the old system of admissions is morally outdated and has 
to be replaced. One should not exclude the chance that once implemented nationwide and 
become predominant form of admissions to higher education, the national test will be more 
successful than it has been so far. 
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